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Recollections of Korea continued from page two One
day when I was inspecting weapons, a practice that I carried out every
day, the strangest wounding took place. A soldier, whose weapon was a
Bren Light Machine Gun, had dismantled it and laid it out on a poncho
for my inspection. I had just finished my inspection of the barrel and
had placed it back on the poncho when an enemy mortar bomb came in. It
was surprising as none of us heard it. I had stood back and was
congratulating the soldier for a job well done when the round landed and
exploded on the weapon. I was not hurt, but the owner of the Bren
received some shrapnel in his wrist and it was bleeding quite badly. The
strange part of this was that another soldier standing in the doorway of
a bunker some 50 feet away, was struck on the back of the head and was
severely wounded. Amazingly, I was not hurt at all. The
chap whose wrist was injured was patched up by the medical officer and
returned for duty that night. Mortar
and shell fragments picked up from “C” Company position indicated
that a large number of different weapons had been recently used in
registration, this coupled with the amount of hostile shelling and
probing pointed to imminent attack. Registration consists of firing onto
a target until it is hit, then recording the range and other technical
data for future use. We
were not informed about this intelligence regarding the large number of
different weapons and as far as we were concerned there was little
indication that the Chinese had chosen this particular time for an
attack — no sharp increase in his patrol activity, no change in his
shelling habits. For the Battalion, as a whole, 2 May started as a quiet
day; for “C” Company, as usual, it was one of heavy shelling and
mortaring. One man was killed in the afternoon when the platoon
Observation Post (OP) received a direct hit and three others were
wounded early in the evening.
The
control problem was the most pressing of the two. My sections were dug
in on the forward and flanking slopes of the hill while my command post
(CP) was on the reverse slope. I had no alternate position from which to
observe and control the fire of my sections. This being the case I could
not command and deploy the platoon as a unit. I
contacted the Signal and the Pioneer officers, and they agreed to come
up to 7 Platoon to discuss these problems. (The Pioneer officer
commanded a platoon that was trained for local engineering tasks of the
battalion such as bunker construction and repairs, disposal of
unexploded bombs and shells, tunnelling and overhead covering, carpenter
work etc.) Knowing that “A” Company would be sending out a patrol at
It
was relatively quiet at this moment, as the day’s harassing fire had
stopped. We went out onto the ground to further discuss my concerns. We
went to the top of the hill to visit my OP, which was actually a
reinforced trench with some camouflage netting over it. It was in
shambles, but was being made operational by a member of the platoon who
had OP duty for that night. From
this vantage point one could see the Chinese positions across the
valley, the approaches to Hill 187, and more importantly to our position
on Hill 97. All my sections were visible as were most of the fire
positions. My concept was to expand and revet my OP, install good
overhead cover and dig tunnels to my sections, thus allowing me to move
to them as necessary or direct their fire from my newly conceived OP/CP.
Both
my visitors agreed that my plan was workable; the Signals officer
remarking that radio transmission and reception from the top of the hill
would be greatly improved. He also noted that the line could be laid to
each section as the tunnelling would provide protection from a direct
hit. The Pioneer officer promised to provide some special material and
guidance on the best method of tackling the construction. The
next step would be to outline the plan to my Company Commander, who had
been made aware of my concerns. I wanted his permission to use some of
the attached Korean Service Corps personnel to help with the digging. We
went back to my CP in time to meet the 16-man “A” Company patrol
that was to set up an ambush in the valley for Chinese recce patrols
seen continuously around 8 Platoon wire. Its second objective was to
stop patrols that might come up the valley and attempt to penetrate
between the RCR and the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry
(PPCLI), the battalion on the RCR right flank. 8 Platoon was prepared to
reinforce the “A” Company patrol should the need arise. As
usual, I guided the patrol to the gap and watched to see it safely
through, after which I returned to my CP for a cup of coffee with my two
guests. It was very dark that night so the Company had not stood down,
waiting until the moon came up.
About
two hours after the ambush patrol had gone out, firing was heard from
the valley. I left my CP and went to the gap in the minefield. I could
see that a fire-fight was going on, but worse I saw numbers of enemy on
either side of the gap taking up positions for an assault. The fact that
they were in a minefield did not seem to bother them. The minefield
probably had been cleared some time before, perhaps even before 3 RCR
had taken over Hill 187. I
rushed back to my CP to inform my Company Commander and the Commanding
Officer and was told that a patrol from 8 Platoon was on its way forward
and I should try to stop it. I took my signaller and went forward to
stop the patrol. However, I was too late as the rescue patrol had passed
through the wire and was ambushed. I
reported to the Commanding Officer and at the same time called for DF
SOS tasks to be fired. (DF SOS tasks are targets that have been
registered previously on approaches that the enemy is likely to use and
would be the most dangerous for a defender. The artillery guns, when not
in use, are loaded and aimed at these targets so that they can be fired
there immediately.) Usually
there is only one DF SOS registered per battalion; however because of
the separation between “B” and “C” Companies there was one in
front of each of them. I could see the enemy shadows moving through the
minefield and dispatched my Sergeant to direct the fire of the section
on the far side of the hill while my other two sections engaged the
enemy to the front and right flank. I
requested the artillery fire be moved in closer to cover all the
approaches on the slope of the hill. I found out later that the 81st
Field Regiment after firing its first SOS task followed up with three
hours of extremely intense fire in which all SOS tasks on the front were
fired repeatedly. In the meantime my six Bren Light Machine Guns and a
30 calibre American machine gun provided devastating interlocking fire
on all sides of our hill. At
this time, I lost contact with Battalion Headquarters so I returned to
my CP and aided by the Signals Officer re-established communications. Then all hell broke loose with the position being pounded by
artillery and mortars. I went forward to observe the action and direct
fire as necessary. During this pounding, the Chinese infantry continued
to move up the hill; No. 7 Platoon threw grenades, worked the bolts of
our Lee Enfield rifles at a fevered pace and fired magazine after
magazine of Bren gun and belt after belt of Browning machine gun
ammunition at the approaching Chinese. The attacking force moved up to the edge of our defences
during this bombardment and appeared to enter our trenches before their
artillery fire was lifted, but I soon realized that the first wave of
the attackers were grenadiers who remained outside the trenches throwing
so many grenades that we defenders believed we were still under enemy
artillery fire. The next wave entered the trenches, closely followed by those
who had been throwing the grenades. The Canadian soldiers, with their outmoded bolt-action rifles,
were forced to deal at close quarters with Chinese firing automatic
weapons. In some instances rifles were used as clubs. I could see that we were fighting a losing cause and something
had to be done to get the Chinese to back off. I ordered the section
commander on the right flank to pass on to the rest of the platoon that
in about five minutes I would call for artillery on our position. I
fought my way back to the CP, stopped on the way by two Chinese who were
not interested in letting me advance. I was armed with a Sten sub machine gun, my pistol and a
primed grenade that hung from my belt. You can imagine my surprise when
I tried to fire my Sten to find that I had failed to place a magazine on
it when I had left the CP some time before. The Chinese shouted at me,
indicating with their weapons that I should surrender. I dropped into a
nearby trench and threw the grenade from my belt. They left and I made
my way back to the CP. I told my signaller to contact Battalion Headquarters and
request artillery fire on our hill. The radio operator then informed me
that the Battery Commander wished to speak with me. The artillery
battery commander, who is in charge of the guns supporting the battalion
in a defensive position, stays with the Commanding Officer and is also
the Commanding Officer’s artillery adviser. I told him what the situation was, and requested he bring down
fire on my position. He informed me that concentrations of proximity-fuzed
rounds would be fired. These are artillery rounds fuzed to explode about
60 feet above the ground and thus would inflict casualties on those not
in trenches or bunkers. The Signals officer went forward to warn some of
the men and stayed in the forward trenches to man a Bren Gun. During this period some remnants of the patrols had made their
way back and a small stretcher party from “A” Company had come
forward to evacuate some of the wounded. One of the soldiers in this
party was an old friend. We had served together as junior NCOs when the
Battalion was stationed in I
did not see him again until after the cease fire in July, 1953 when I
visited him in hospital. He told me that that night after I had chased
him from my CP he went out to discover an oriental in a padded suit, who
he assumed was one of our Korean Service Corps, struggling with a
stretcher carrying a body. He soon realized his big mistake, and was
hustled by another Chinese with a Burp gun into the enemy lines, there
to spend the remainder of the war. The
Pioneer officer was also captured and was held prisoner until the end of
the war. I did not see him again, but the following is extracted from an
article published in the Ottawa Journal August, 1953. The article
was written by Bill Boss, Canadian Press Staff Writer from “Thirteen
Canadian soldiers, including the first Canadian officer to be released,
regained their freedom today in the continuing exchange of prisoners of
war. All but two were available for interviews and all appeared to be
fairly well, although the officer, 2nd Lt. Charles Owen of the 3rd
Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment, from Vancouver, had the roughest
experience in captivity of any Canadian so far returned . . . He said
that before his capture during a battle in which the 3rd Battalion of
the Royal Canadian Regiment was engaged on May 3 — he was captured on
his 24th birthday, incidentally — he sat out one barrage in a latrine
in a forward position. When
the barrage lifted the Chinese were running down a trench. 'I reached
out with my pistol and shot three through the head. My pistol jammed,
but I still had some grenades which I threw when I heard more Chinese
coming. The Chinese threw some back into the latrine. One landed at my
feet. I put my foot on it and all it did was blow my feet into the air
and a small fragment into my seat.' Owen
suffered head and arm wounds at the same time. The
Chinese guessed that he had no more ammunition. They shouted: ‘Hey,
Joe, surrender. No harm.’ Owen
said he gave himself up and was taken into the Chinese lines, where
enemy soldiers ‘pulled my hands down and started to pump them as
though trying to make friends’. He was in pain and after getting
rudimentary wound dressings was given white pills looking like rice
seeds. ‘I
took one and it knocked me out until next morning.’” One
of my NCOs who was also captured that night and was repatriated some
time later told me that Lieutenant Owen was brought into the area where
he was sitting and was told to sit down beside him. The NCO said that
“Mr. Owen was streaked with blood, covered with excreta and was some
smelly.” I would imagine that one of those grenades had gone down the
hole.
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