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Recollections of Korea continued from page three Earlier
in this story, I mentioned that I had sent my Platoon Sergeant forward
to direct the fire of one of the sections. He did not arrive there.
During the intense bombardment, prior to the Chinese hitting our
trenches, one of the bunkers received a number of direct hits that
dislodged some of the sandbags. Sergeant Stone just happened to be
passing at the time and he was knocked unconscious by the falling
sandbags and partly covered by the debris. Recovering
consciousness he was surprised to find a Chinese signaller sitting on
him while he passed messages on his radio. In the words of the
stunned sergeant: “I lay very still until he left”. At
this point I will describe what was going on at the guns. Lieutenant Reg
Redknap, a very good friend of mine, was in charge. The guns had been
active for some time covering the withdrawl of both the ambushed “A”
and “C” Company patrols. The next order received was to fire the DF
SOS. Reg
did not receive these orders directly, as a line was being used for
communications which meant that a Signaller was manning the telephone
and recording the fire orders. He told him to ask “Which one?” Having
been told, he fired it. The next order he got was “Oboe Tare 360
degrees drop 200 V T fire until ordered to stop”. (Oboe Tare stands
for “the compass bearing from the observer to target, information
required for laying the guns.) Reg
grabbed the phone, the battery commander was on the other end, and
asked: “Is this correct because it now puts the fire right on the
platoon position?” The
reply, “Yes, I know. Bloody well do it.” “Yes,
sir.” The
first of our artillery came down. It was an intense bombardment that
sounded like the worst thunderstorm one could imagine. After some time I
asked the fire be lifted and I went forward with a soldier to appreciate
the situation. I preceded the soldier from the bunker and as we exited a
round came in and I hit the ground. Those water cans that I reported on
earlier were pierced by the shrapnel from the exploding mortar and their
contents spewed over me; for some seconds I was not convinced that this
was water. I was dreadfully afraid that it might be blood. We
went forward and found the position still overrun. Chinese were
everywhere with lots of their own dead and wounded. The Chinese were
rolling bodies over the side of the hill where litter bearers were
hauling them away. We
made our way back towards the CP, but as we were passing a bunker we
were jumped by three Chinese. Somehow we both extricated ourselves from
their clutches and I shouted “over the wall”. We both dove over a
sandbag wall and returned the fire of our assailants. My partner raised
himself for a better shot and was immediately cut down with the whole
magazine of a burp gun. I noticed a box of grenades in the corner of
this fire position and I brought it forward and started lobbing grenades
at my oppressors. It
was just like throwing rocks because none of the grenades exploded.
Earlier that day an order had come down from Higher Headquarters stating
that only two primed grenades were allowed in the fire positions as some
soldier had accidentally killed himself with a grenade. I
had passed on this order to my troops. I was sure, to my dismay, that
the person who owned that fire position was the only person in the
platoon who had complied. I
reached to the other end of the box, took a grenade, pulled the pin and
threw it. There was an explosion and a shout of pain and the three took
off. My escort was dead. I
made my way back to the CP and called for a continuation of the
artillery support. When it was finally lifted I again toured the
position gathering what troops I could still locate. There were
scattered enemy, but most were returning to the Chinese lines. Besides
the artillery support from his own regiment, the Commanding Officer of
the 81st Field Regiment, who was with the Brigade Commander at Brigade
Headquarters, had been co-ordinating the fire from the other two
artillery field regiments of the Division and all available medium and
heavy guns of the Corps artillery on the approaches to the battlefield
and the batteries supporting the Chinese attack. The battle was over
except for more Canadian Artillery action. At
first light the returning Chinese battalion was caught in the open by
one of our Air Observation Post pilots who directed devastating fire on
it. He enjoyed excellent shooting until the Chinese thwarted observation
with a dense smoke screen. Conclusion By
The
night’s action had cost the enemy an estimated 80 fatal casualties;
there was no estimate of the wounded. The
immediate awards were two Military Crosses, three Military Medals and
three Mentioned in Dispatches. The
80 casualties are an official estimate. Recently Mike Badowich, one of
my NCOs who had been taken prisoner, said when he was being escorted to
the rear by the Chinese he observed several stacks of bodies, each
containing about 50 soldiers. According
to Redknap, who spoke to the pilot of the Air Op, 80 appears to be
extremely low. The pilot said that the Chinese were caught in the open
and it was like shooting fish in a barrel. Combat
dogs Dogs
of many breeds and sizes were trained to discover mines. The handler
would have his dog on a leash and would sweep, with the dog, back and
forth in front of him straight down a field. The demonstration that I
observed had six handlers with dogs proceeding six abreast down a field.
If
the dog discovered a mine, it would sit down with his fore feet spread
and the handler would prod with a bayonet until he discovered the mine.
The mine was then marked for destruction. The dogs often turned up large
stones, tin cans and other large debris, but never missed a mine. Patrol
dogs had handlers who were brave and committed to their dogs. These
dogs, trained by their handlers, practised on Koreans, as did the guard
dogs. It seems that all Orientals were detectable, probably by their
scent, whether Chinese, Korean, Japanese. The
3rd Battalion was the first RCR Battalion to use dogs. I do not think
any other Canadian unit ever used them. I
led patrols with dogs and a handler on a number of occasions. The usual
procedure was to request a dog through Battalion Headquarters who made
application to the British Engineer Unit. The handler, and his dog,
would be escorted to your platoon area in time for the briefing prior to
the particular patrol. It was always important to ensure your Katcoms or
any Korean Service Corps members were out of sight in bunkers before the
dogs arrived. On
patrol, if the dog detected Chinese in the area, he would stop, bare his
teeth and emit a low growl, pointing like a hunting dog toward the area
where he detected the enemy. My modus operandi was to withdraw and call
down fire from the artillery or from the tank of the armoured regiment
supporting our battalion. We would then proceed. I
never found any evidence of any killed or wounded, but I always felt
much safer as we proceeded and the dog offered no further alarm. I well
remember one patrol leader who did not believe the dog and proceeded
further to investigate. He was ambushed and killed. The
dog, a German Shepherd named Killer, was also killed on that patrol in
front of Hill 159, our last position. I had patrolled with Killer and
his handler and the other dog, Bruce.
He
was a KIWI ( New Zealander) and a first class fellow. For the remainder
of the tour we were good friends. Nothing
much was going on, the odd shell arriving from time to time, but no
great problems. I accompanied him on his duties with the platoon, which
were just carrying out minor maintenance on their fire positions. Each
morning we toured his platoon perimeter. I thoroughly enjoyed the change
and learned a few Australian idioms and expressions. After
two days, I returned to my own platoon bringing my new found KIWI friend
with me. We were putting in some protective wiring and blowing up a
number of holes in front of the company that were presumably used by
Chinese observers some time in the past. We were not being harassed too
badly so we visited a number of other platoon positions and had some
enjoyable times swapping stories. After
a couple of days, two Australian Corporals joined us and I left the KIWI
in charge of my platoon, taking with me two of my junior NCOs. I arrived
at 7 Platoon, 1 RAR. We were to stay seven days carrying on normal
duties. The Australian troops were great. After two days, the Company
Commander called me to his bunker and told me that that night a fighting
patrol from his company would be going out to set up an ambush in the
area of the “mound”. This was a particularly nasty bit of ground
where the Chinese always seemed to be active. It
was in this area that we had suffered casualties and had lost our patrol
dog “Killer”. The Company Commander called the officer, who was to
be the patrol leader that night to his bunker for a briefing, the gist
of which was “You will be leading this patrol, but I will be
commanding it”. That
night I joined the Company Commander and his sergeant major in his
bunker. Radio communications between the patrol and the Company
Commander were checked and the patrol set out. The patrol was to report
in every 15 minutes, which it did. After
about 45 minutes the platoon commander reported enemy at a certain grid
reference and requested permission to fall back and call down fire on
them. He was told by his Company Commander to push on as they were only
pigs (Wild pigs did roam no man’s land area and they were often
mistaken for enemy). However,
on Canadian patrols, the patrol leader was in charge and had the
authority to deploy the patrol as he wished. A short time later, again
the same request. The officer had dispatched a scout ahead of his patrol
who now reported seeing a number of enemy. Again
the reply: “Push on; it is just pigs”. Soon the valley resounded
with the sound of Burp guns and the patrol was withdrawn, with one
killed and two wounded. I
was sure glad we were not operating in this same fashion and was most
happy to return to my own regiment just in case the Company Commander
from 1 RAR decided it would be a good time for the acting 7 Platoon
Commander to take out an Australian Patrol. AWARD
OF THE MILITARY CROSS On
the night of 2/3 may 1953, “C” Company, 3rd Battalion, The Royal
Canadian Regiment, sustained a heavy attack by superior enemy forces which
was accompanied by an intense preliminary bombardment. The brunt of the
attack was borne by No. 7 Platoon of “C” Company occupying a feature
known as Hill 97 commanded by 2nd Lieutenant Hollyer. The
Platoon had occupied this position for thirteen days prior to the attack
during which time the position was subjected to consistent shelling and
mortaring with devastating effects on the defences. During this period
this officer preserved a calm and cheerful manner with his troops,
inspiring them to great effort in repairing and improving their positions.
On the night of the attack warning of the enemy’s presence was received
from a fighting patrol which encountered the enemy on the right front of
No. 3 Platoon. Lieutenant
Hollyer placed himself in a position to observe this action and a
subsequent action which resulted when a second fighting patrol was sent
out to assist the first and became engaged in the battle. He passed back
rapid and accurate information on the progress of this action, which
forewarned his Commanding Officer of the impending enemy attack and
permitted him to make preparations for the ensuing battle. During
this stage in spite of heavy shelling he continued to visit his section
posts, to encourage and inspire his men to man their positions and
directed their fire upon the enemy with devastating effect. As the battle
progressed he returned to his command post periodically to report
developments to his commanding officer in a cool and confident manner. He
called for artillery fire on the enemy within a few yards of and on all
sides of his positions with skill and accuracy. Leaving his bunker as
necessary and with complete disregard for his personal safety to observe
and report the results. On one such occasion he was blown back into his
bunker and on another was personally engaged by the enemy which he drove
off. Eventually,
as a result of the weight of the attack, his position was overrun.
Lieutenant Hollyer remained at his post driving off the enemy with
grenades, at the same time calling for fire on his own position. During
this bombardment his communications were disrupted but he remained on the
post until the enemy were driven off. He then toured his position to
assess the situation and was again attacked by several enemy. He
re-established communications with Battalion Headquarters and requested
and was granted permission to retire with his survivors to No. 8 Platoon
position from where he directed rescue parties going forward. There is no
doubt that this officer’s initiative, determination and skill in
fighting coupled with his inspiring leadership and complete disregard for
his own personal safety contributed beyond measure to the defeat of the
enemy and to the success of the entire defensive battle. Lieutenant-Colonel
(Ret) Edgar H. Hollyer, MC, CD, served with the RCAF from 1942 to 1944
then joined the Canadian Army as a private in 1945.
He was commissioned in 1951, served with the 3rd Battalion
Royal Canadian Regiment in After returning
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